NBA v WBD: ENPs and LMRs, how they work and why everyone hates them
The homework notes from The Bundle podcast, compiled by Murray Barnett and Yannick Ramcke
NBA v TNT – ENPs and LMRs, how they work and why everyone hates them
What happened?
NBA has secured $75.9 billion:
Disney $2.6 billion per year.
NBC and Peacock $2.5 billion per year.
Amazon $1.8 billion per year.
Almost 3x more $$ - Almost NFL type money ($10bn/year) – Does this make NFL think its undervalued?
NBA chose Amazon Prime Video as one of the 3 primary rights holders starting with the upcoming season
NBA – “Our new arrangement with Amazon supports this goal by complementing the broadcast, cable and streaming packages that are already part of our new Disney and NBCUniversal arrangements. All three partners have also committed substantial resources to promote the league and enhance the fan experience.”
TNT – “We have matched the Amazon offer, as we have a contractual right to do, and do not believe the NBA can reject it … We think they have grossly misinterpreted our contractual rights with respect to the 2025-26 season and beyond, and we will take appropriate action.”
TNT Sports/WBD exercised their matching rights
One of the key points is definition - In WBD’s original contract, signed in 2014, definition of media was “Television” (no distinction between cable television/IPTV/satellite television. “Television,” WBD argues in its complaint, “is ubiquitous with content consumers watch on a television at home, in a sports bar, or virtually anywhere else”.
In fact, WBD goes on to argue that “excluding all other forms of distribution” — in favour of a streaming-forward Amazon Prime Video — makes “no business sense and runs directly contrary to the NBA’s own interest in maximising viewership”.
Reach:
Amazon CEO told shareholder in April - Amazon Prime Video reaches over 200 million monthly viewers “in our most popular entertainment offerings”, including sports.
WBD stated in May Max OTT service had nearly 100 million subscribers globally.
Package – Amazon is main partner for in season Tournament Nov/Dec – key ‘selling season’ for Amazon.
What exactly are ENP’s and LMR’s and how can they be enforced?
ENP – Exclusive negotiating period
LMR – Last matching right
Usual contains economic considerations (fee and payment terms) and other elements such as distribution (platforms) and marketing commitments
In 2000, the Delaware Supreme Court ruled in favour of WWE after cable channel USA Network filed a lawsuit arguing that it did not have to match every aspect of competitor Viacom’s offer to satisfy a right of refusal clause in its contract. Following the ruling, the rights were awarded to media group Viacom. “The incumbent party wasn’t able to prove that they matched the third party offer adequately”
The perils of ENP’s and LMR’s (beautifully summarised by Mike Darcey on LinkedIn):
ENP’s – “…everyone cheats and there is no realistic sanction…. everyone knows the process has started and other bidders have enormous incentive to ensure the seller knows their appetite. Can anyone detect a seller receiving an unsolicited text, or sanction them for reading it”
LMR’s – “…sellers hate them. [why didn’t incumbent put that price down initially?]… the resentment .. gives the seller an incentive not to honour the LMR, noting that “matching” is often about more than price and there is considerable potential for finding some dimension on which the incumbent has fallen short.
Why it matters
Turner/TNT have had NBA since 1984.
Early August Zaslav advised investors that WBD had recorded a $9.1 billion write-down on the value of its cable TV networks, the share price dropped to $6.73. Since the merger closed two years ago, the value of WBD’s stock has plummeted 72%.
Recently WBD have acquired College Football Playoff games from ESPN, and a Big East basketball package + rights to the French Open. NASCAR will be on NBC in 2025 + existing LMB, US National Team Soccer and NHL. Not enough to compensate for loss of NBA.
Potential outcomes:
The NBA accepts WBD’s proposal – Amazon paid 3 years upfront – can WBD meet that?
A settlement is reached.
A fourth package of rights – unlikely (Amazon bid on the premise of three national packages)
The NBA denies WBD’s proposal.
WBD claiming breach of contract, NBA countering WBD cannot not meet future contract terms.
July 26 WBD file claim in New York Supreme Court on July 26. NBA has until August 23 to respond (likely asking the judge to dismiss the complaint).
WBD is seeking a jury trial on four causes of action:
breach of contract – specific performance (being awarded the rights)
monetary damages (financial compensation if rights are not granted or are not seen to be sufficient remedy)
declaratory judgement (court ruling in WBD’s favour on the facts)
breach of contract – circumvention (ruling that NBA was not acting in good faith).
WBD has also questioned the NBA’s good faith:
In its filing, WBD argues that the NBA “never intended” to allow the company to match the Amazon offer in the first place, arguing that the league specifically ensured it would be able to refuse WBD’s matching rights proposal.
It claims that the NBA delayed sending WBD Amazon and NBCU’s offers, intended to give the NBA “more time to craft provisions intended to thwart” WBD’s matching bid of either offer.
It adds that the NBA allegedly “carefully and meticulously crafted” Amazon’s offer to circumvent any bid from WBD, including by agreeing to include provisions that “the NBA believes [WBD’s channel] TBS and WBD could or would not perform”.
The NBA has an arbitration clause in its contract - “It’s less expensive, out of the public eye, private — you cannot pull arbitration filings off the internet,”
Conclusions
Have WBD dropped the ball? - Warner Bros. Discovery CEO David Zaslav at an RBC Investor Conference in November 2022 said that Turner and WBD “don’t have to have the NBA” once their current deal expires.
Now it appears they do want it (at any price)
Its not going to be pretty
WBD about to going into carriage negotiations (in 2025)
They current pay $1.2bn/year - TNT, 65 regular-season NBA games and shares the Conference Championship series with Disney.
With revenue at an estimated $3 per subscriber per month, TNT make in $2.56 billion in passive revenue.
One commentator – “A 25% reduction for TNT would equate to $621 million lost cable revenue. DTC revenue potential even more difficult”
Makes Venu even more tricky for them – whole separate issue with FUBO’s anti-trust case..
Malone (WBD board) - “The big tech guys are just going to just continue to put numbers on the table that the traditional companies, broadcast or cable, will have a very hard time matching,…. big tech obviously doesn’t have to worry about the bundle”
LMR’s and to a certain extent ENP’s are unenforceable.
Allowed the NBA latitude to adjust terms and conditions to suit them (assuming they had made up their mind Amazon was the preferred option)
Wall Street’s faith in Zaslav’s ability to turn the ship around is dwindling. The company’s stock price has sunk to all-time lows. And chatter is building around the prospect of a breakup of Warner’s assets.
Sportico – “Zaslav’s famously hard-nosed approach to negotiations has alienated important contributors to WBD’s cash flow: advertisers, sports leagues, and Hollywood talent A cloud of ill will can be a detriment to the long-term health of a company where the main asset is creativity, not the TV networks or digital properties that display it.”
The Yannick Pull Quote
“Exclusive negotiation periods and last matching rights are having what COVID was for force majeure events, and we can be sure that these clauses will face more scrutiny during contract drafting processes going forward — it will probably require more than the five-page LMR which the NBA and WBD had in place, which apparently still left too much room for interpretation. The fact of the matter is that licensors will always be able to get out of such unilateral extension clauses if they want to, by introducing a poison pill related to whatever: definition of the distribution system, reach, payment terms, audience demographics. Does it impact the future relationship between WBD and NBA (or other rights owners)? I don‘t think so, this industry is highly skilled at compartmentalizing things. I also remain intrigued by the potential for any face-saving settlement which may or may not include NBA TV‘s national game inventory, which is vast in quantity, but limited in quality.”
The future of sports streaming in the US is about to be decided in the courts
What happened?
A court case in the US will determine the future of Sports streaming in the US – That point is agreed by both Fubo and Venu. The losers business is doomed.
Judge Garnett upheld Fubo’s claims that the joint venture, which would house over 50% of all US sports rights on one service, would lessen competition, limit consumer choice, enable price gouging, and impinge on the ability of Venu’s rivals to do business in a competitive fashion.
Venus three media companies will refuse to license out just their sports channels to distributors like Fubo, (but would do to their JV - Venu). Fubo says the JV will spark a wave of cord-cutting at pay TV distributors, with sports fans favouring lower-priced Venu.
Venu is a 14 channels service from Disney, Fox, and Warner Bros. Discovery (a “skinny” bundle of premium sports channels, including ESPN, Fox Sports, the SEC Network, + mainstream channels that carry sports eg TNT). Planned to launch Aug. 23 (now blocked) supposedly targeted at cord-cutters and casual fans as well as diehard sports fans. Pricing is $42.99 a month.
Disney, Fox, and WBD asserted that they’re not gunning for Fubo’s subscribers but rather targeting consumers who have already abandoned traditional pay TV, as well as so-called “cord-nevers”
WBD anticipates that the cannibalization of traditional pay TV by Venu will max out at 20 percent.
Claims it will have 5m subs by 2029 and 70% of US major sports rights
Fubo had demanded the defendants be blocked from launching Venu Sports.
Preliminary injunctions are difficult to obtain. They are considered extraordinary and drastic forms of relief.
A trial might not take place until 2025.
FuboTV’s counsel told the judge that they will run out of money by early 2025 if Venu is allowed to launch.
Each Venu partner will continue to individually license sports content after Venu launches. EG, Disney will continue to directly offer consumers ESPN content.
Venu Sports will be a non-exclusive licensee of content, meaning the content it offers can be licensed to other providers.
Other competition:
Amazon Prime and Netflix streaming NFL games and Apple TV+ streaming MLB and MLS games
Regional sports network market, including YES and MSG teaming up to launch a direct-to-consumer venture, Gotham Advanced Media and Entertainment (GAME).
Other possible ventures such as, hypothetically, CBS and NBCU joining forces
The proceedings largely focused on establishing the competitive landscape and the potential for irreparable harm should Venu launch.
Attorneys for FuboTV, ESPN, Walt Disney, Warner Brothers Discovery and Hulu have concluded round one of their Venu Sports legal saga delivering closing arguments before U.S. District Judge Margaret M. Garnett in New York’s Thurgood Marshall Courthouse.
The federal judge has blocked the planned Aug. 23 launch of Venu, a collaboration among the three media giants.“[I]t appears to the Court that Fubo is likely to succeed on its claims that by entering into the JV, the JV Defendants will substantially lessen competition and restrain trade in the relevant market in violation of Section 7 of the Clayton Act,” she wrote in a 69-page decision.
Why it matters
Cable is dying, legacy media has to do something - WBD is under extreme pressure to change strategy from a business that’s rapidly deteriorating. “We need to get to younger people,” WBD CRO Bruce Campbell said, later admitting, “Fox and Disney were going to go forward whether we joined or not.”
Venu, is critical to WBD (in particular), Disney and the other partners streaming strategies.
Fubo portrays Venu Sports as borne through an anticompetitive consolidation of competitors that are behaving like a “cartel,” with a shared interest to exclude Fubo and other streamers from offering nationally broadcast sports content. If Venu Sports is allowed to proceed, Fubo could be driven out of the steaming market and consumers might be left with higher prices and fewer choices. Or so Fubo contends.
Lawyers for Disney, Fox, and WBD argue Venu is actually pro-competitive by introducing another player into the pay TV market
Fubo says it and other streamers have been denied the chance to offer consumers their own skinny sports bundles …. with the defendants requiring bundled packages … that sports fans don’t watch and don’t want to pay for.
FuboTV’s counsel told the judge that the company will run out of money by early 2025 if Venu is allowed to launch.
As the defendants see it, Fubo is simply worried about losing customers to a superior platform that offers sports fans what they want.
DirecTV/Dish Network/Newsmax, all signed a letter FuboTV sent in May to several key U.S. Senate committees looking for Congressional hearings. Suggests its been a long held belief there isn’t a level playing field.
Conclusions
The marketplace for sports broadcasting is ever changing. Whilst Venu might seem like the right thing now, it might not be (or might evolve) in future years. If delayed, will the concept survive?
The changes could be seismic – there has been largely unchecked consolidation in the entertainment industry. Big question is will this still stand following appeals from the 3 defendants?
The Yannick Pull Quote
“Venu Sports’ impact on the downstream distribution market had been hotly debated, from additive to a cannibalizing zero-sum distribution game, from seismic to a non-starter. Its aggressive pricing strategy of $42.99 per month upon launch would have certainly been aggressive, even undercutting the mere input programming costs for competing third-party (virtual) multi-channel video programming distributors. These are not arm’s length transactions but internal transfer prices, which may have put the streaming joint venture in a position for a profitable business. That’s in addition to the fact that circumventing bundling and minimum penetration guarantees usually applicable to third-party distributors would have allowed them to exclusively offer such more relevant, streamlined sports-centric streaming package that its soon-to-be competitors always wanted to offer. Antitrust is broader than consumer harm — and while it’s unarguable that Venu Sports meets insufficiently served consumer market demand, it can also materialize in the form of multi-company collision between upstream programmers becoming downstream distribution (including contractually manifested non-compete clauses). It might never see the light of the day.”
“Is the juice worth the squeeze” - DAZN says bienvenue to Ligue 1 in France
What happened?
Conclusion to an ongoing 10-year saga of media rights in France stretching back to BeIN’s entry into the market and MediaPro’s failed Telefoot project.
League had publicly demanded EUR 1bn and threatened the launch of their own DTC
Pretty damning summary in Sports Business – “Political miscalculation, conflicts of interest, inflated egos, resignations, confused governance, poor market research, reverse engineering of valuations, constant leaks to the press and global corporate strategies were all factors which shaped the outcome of Ligue 1’s recent media rights process.”
Previous
In 2018 (for 2020-2021 season start) LFP awarded 80% of Ligue 1 rights to Mediapro (for a record price €780 million per year for 8 games) - for standalone Ligue 1 service (Telefoot) which collapsed a few months into its first season.
Set off a chain reaction of angering C+, a broadcast partner for decades.
Cycle just ended:
8 matches/week - Amazon - €250m
2 matches/week - beIN - €332m (sublicensed to Canal Plus)
Near live – Free - €42m/season
Amazon acquired 80% of fixtures to 2023-24 which further rankled C+ as it was ‘cut price’ compared to what they were paying having picked up games from BeIN.
Outcome
Income for Ligue 1 set to hit about €652m per season, down almost 8% on previous values
DAZN reportedly paying €400m/year for 8 out of 9 Ligue 1 matches/week for 5 seasons (2028-29 season). BeIN gets 1 (but alternate weeks top fixture) for €100m/year (interesting delta from top fixture to ‘the rest’). BeIN also has Ligue 2
DAZN Pricing
DAZN’s full Ligue 1 package €29.99 per month with a one-year commitment,
€39.99 per month without a one-year commitment.
1 match a week available at €14.99/19.99
Other sports:
NFL Game Pass, the PFL, LNB Élite basketball.
Other offer was DTC with WDB
Peak advised LFP (felt along with CVC subs numbers required were aggressive)
Why it matters
Nowhere close to €1 billion ask
Alternative was DTC - LFP believed it could get 2m subs and €578 million in revenues. Peak Consultancy advised LFP (that the numbers were aggressive and risky)
Contract with DAZN includes:
Automatic Ligue bonus of €50 million if DAZN reach 1.5 million subs
“Exit clauses” if DAZN don’t reach that number
BeIN contract includes €20m sponsorship
DAZN live channel also available on C+
C+ has decided carriage of 3rd parties preferable to dealing directly with LFP
Conclusion
Upsides as reported by Sports Business:
DAZN a new buyer
Allegedly strong competition at the end with Amazon and BeIN involved
BeIN still spending on French football
€100m per season (including sponsorship) for Ligue 1 rights
€40m per season for Ligue 2
€70m per season for international rights in its markets.
Exit clauses give some flexibility to go back to the market
International rights have doubled in value
BeIN Sports have just agreed a 27-market deal for Ligue 1 and Ligue 2 for the US, Canada, Turkiye, and the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) through 2028-29.
Data/Streaming rights excluded:
Infront Bettor will pay €31m/seaon for the next five seasons (100% increase)
Didn’t have to go down DTC route
Sponsorship doing well - €16m/season to €30m/season (Uber Eats to McDonald’s)
Sports fees (for domestic markets) outside US have topped out and DTC is not a viable alternative (unless forced to).
Skillset and appetite for risk make DTC undesirable
PE involvement with various leagues has not yet resulted in a positive impact on media rights renewals (see also Premiership Rugby) – It appears CVC could be entitled to increase the size of its stake in LFP Media at no extra cost or take more than 13 per cent of the commercial income.
The Yannick Pull Quote
An in-house DTC channel has yet again proven to be nothing more than an increasingly unviable bargaining chip, even though the league’s opportunity costs had significantly decreased, to as low as single-digit millions for bottom-third teams. Going direct-to-consumer and the lack of risk transfer from licensor to licensee is simply not aligned with football‘s operations and mindset where revenues must be fully guaranteed to make anyone‘s budget. That is despite that I imagine that CVC had pushed for going down the route of the DTC channel: Their impact made through other investments (e.g. LaLiga, Six Nations Rugby) has been minimal, and practically nothing else than a banking function pulling forward future revenues. The league-operated channel would have increased the range of outcomes, both to the down- and upside. The numbers just did not come close to what could be had in a deflationary market environment. For DAZN, in particular, it is a reasonable cost base that creates a path towards profitability.”
WNBA – Is this their moment in the US rights market?
What happened?
All-Star Game in Phoenix between Team USA and Team WNBA drew a record 3.44 million viewers, more than double the previous mark of 1.44, which was set in 2003 when the game took place at Madison Square Garden.
The game was the most-watched WNBA game on any ESPN network third-most-watched WNBA game ever
Before this season, the WNBA had not hit the one million viewership mark in 16 years, according to Sports Media Watch. Now it hits seven-figure numbers regularly.
WNBA’s “Rising Tide” Of Popularity Played Key Role In Disney NBA Renewal, ESPN Chairman Jimmy Pitaro Says
NBA includes the WNBA’s media rights in its negotiations.
WNBA reported to receive $2.2 billion as part of the $76 billion NBA package.
6x increase
$200 million per year.
Another package available for circa $60m
Scripps/ION currently pays $13m/year for 25 games
Combined total more than MLS!
Why it matters
WNBA audience growing as the season progresses.
NBA sucked up heavy losses in earlier years
Revenue split - WNBA owners (42%), NBA owners (42%), and an investment group (16%) that provided the WNBA with $75 million in 2022 (that 75% was 40% more than Endeavour consultants valued it).
New deal is close to MLS/Apple
Expected WNBA annual profit next year
Recommendation from the media-consulting team at Endeavor Group valued the WNBA at just $125 million per year – NBA insisted on more.
Conclusions
11 years along time for a league growing rapidly (and likely to expand number of games and plays over summer period – desirable)
The deal has a price ‘reevaluation’ set after the 2028 season.
Better to have revenue certainty in changing media landscape?
Could there be an opt out clause at some point (other than 2028 ‘reevaluation’)?
The Yannick Pull Quote
“The total outcome, the overall cake doesn‘t offer much room for criticism of the NBA‘s bundle media rights strategy. The question is about the revenue allocation which remained constant (approx. 3%) compared to the previous cycle, despite one ascending (WNBA) and one descending (NBA) property, at least when it comes to TV ratings — the calculus is bigger than this though: WNBA has no proven pay value yet or demonstrated the ability to drive subscriptions … which obviously impacts (stand-alone) market valuation.”
YouTube replaces FA Player as streaming home of WSL
What happened?
All 66 games not broadcast by Sky Sports or the BBC will be live streamed globally on the league’s YouTube channel.
YouTube channels will also show regular content dedicated to each division, including highlights, post-match interviews and shoulder content
FA Player to continue streaming live Women’s FA Cup fixtures and content
Earlier this year, the WSL confirmed it would roll over its domestic rights deals with Sky Sports and the BBC for another season, with 66 of the league’s 132 fixtures to be televised.
Sky Sports will show up to 44 WSL games during the 2024/25 season
BBC will broadcast 22 live games, with at least 18 to be shown on its linear channels.
Why it matters
NewCo is still finding its fee and broadcast roll over means using a broad distribution platform like YouTube is a great stop gap for visibility
DAZN has been acquiring rights to women’s football (UWCL, Spain/France/Germany women’s leagues to build a destination for women’s sports for their subscription offer – wider women’s sports ambitions)
Conclusions
Seems like the obvious thing to do – NewCo too new, no staff in place, want to be maters of their own destiny rather than relying on FA
Banking on YT to increase trajectory of reach to entice real fees out of future partners
Timing not right for the competitive dynamics in the UK media market
The Yannick Pull Quote
“Women‘s football will struggle to replicate the media rights - heavy revenue mix of men‘s football. Opting for a reach-first distribution strategy, especially for the league‘s mid-to-long-tail match inventory is a logical outcome of limited pay value in the eye of consumers and its reliance on sponsorship monies. Consumer consumption barriers, including costs and discovery, must be limited at this stage of the sport‘s development cycle.”
Is Netflix ever going to get into sports (properly)?
What happened?
Netflix release Q2 earnings
Subscribers at 277.7 million up 3% from 269.6 million in prior quarter and up 16% from 238.4 million a year ago. 2024 revenue to grow by 14% to 15% from last year.
Revenue grew 17% in the quarter to $9.56 billion, while net income increased 44% to $2.15 billion.
Ad-supported plans grew by 34%, showing the increasing role of that dual-revenue stream in its future. Netflix additionally raised the low end of its full-year guidance, and it expects
Why it matters
Sports on Netflix:
3 – year deal to show NFL Christmas Day games, beginning with a doubleheader (because Xmas falls on a Weds) this year
Netflix likes because:
Holiday sign-ups
Reduces churn
Good demo for advertising
Concerns about the live stream. Netflix’s infrastructure supports multiplexing rather than livestreaming at scale,
Previous problems with live events - April 2023 tech meltdown for its Love is Blind live reunion show.
Can Netflix sell advertising? Demanding $800k/spot during a traditionally weak day
WWE weekly flagship show, Raw.
The Roast of Tom Brady attracted its “largest live audience yet,” with 22.6 million views.
Broader push to create a series of big events ‘playing’ in sports without the costly rights investments.
Ted Sandros (on live content) “our members love it, it drives a ton of engagement, and it drives a ton of excitement… Those things are very valuable. So the good thing is that advertisers like that, too, and they like it for the exact same reason.”
Conclusions
Still no appetite for traditional sports rights acquisitions
Still largely the ‘game around the game’.
No major US rights to acquire
F1 long talked about but doesn’t fit the model?
Sports might only make sense if there is a further premium tier – Netflix start behaving like a traditional pay sports broadcaster
First streaming profit for Disney
What happened?
The media giant’s combined streaming business, which consists of Disney+, Hulu, and ESPN+, was profitable for the first time. They generated a profit in the third quarter (Q3) of the financial year, primarily due to the ESPN+ platform.
For the three months ending June 29, Disney posted revenue of $23.1 billion and income of almost $3.1 billion.
Revenue is up 4% from the previous year when the company suffered a $134 million loss.
Disney’s total segment operating income increased 19% to $4.2 billion, led by the positive results for its entertainment unit, particularly streaming.
The combined streaming business posted an operating profit of $47 million compared with a loss of $512 million in the same quarter last year.
The profit came a quarter earlier than Disney had expected and was helped by $66 million from ESPN+, which offset a loss of $19 million from Disney+ and Hulu.
Why it matters
ESPN’s domestic business contributed $3.9 billion to the overall revenue and $1.1 billion of the operating income.
The (skinny) bundle works!
Will trigger price increases as initial phase of customer acquisition peaks
Disney, this week, announced a price increase for streaming subscriptions of $1 to $2 monthly from October. ESPN+ will increase in price from $10.99 to $11.99 per month.
Meanwhile, the Disney+ basic and premium packages will now be priced at $9.99 and $15.99, respectively (up from $7.99 and $13.99). Hulu with ads will cost $9.99 monthly (up from $7.99), while Hulu without ads will cost $18.99 per month (up from $17.99).
The price hikes are part of Disney’s continued strategy to entice customers to purchase its streaming services bundles.
Disney expects the profitability of its combined streaming businesses to further improve in Q4, with ESPN+ expected to be profitable again in the quarter.
Conclusions
More about narrative for Disney – very skewed by allocation of programming costs (to cable).
However Disney seem to have the most comprehensive and thought out approach to DTC
The Yannick Pull Quote
“ESPN+ has undoubtedly been the main beneficiary of the Disney bundle, overcoming its plateaued growth in late 2019. Reporting on-paper profitability ($66M in Q3/2024) for one of its streaming services ahead of schedule has been much-need positive signalling towards the investment community. It may have required some financial engineering, though, including a disproportionate revenue allocation from the bundle’s ARPU (as a function of stand-alone consumer prices) compared to business impact as well as favourable cost allocation keys for programming costs for content shared with linear ESPN/ABC, which remain the profit engine of the company and can absorb a bigger cost burden. Notably, ESPN+ had 24.8 million subs as of May, which was its lowest total since 2022.”
Postscript
Sportico - Paris Olympics Average 30.7M Viewers on NBCU, Biggest Since 1994
The Yannick Pull Quote
The overall news and perception is positive, even if the US numbers are normalized for a confluence of things which certainly supported strong comparables versus the long-delayed Tokyo Games 2021, including but not limited to opening up real-time broadcast coverage on Peacock without any holdbacks for prime time coverage on linear TV, full stadiums and venues including the atmosphere that comes with it, as well as the more favorable time zone impact for the US market, which don’t make this apples-to-apples. Interestingly, the audience data also proved that linear TV remains the single-most powerful, albeit declining, distribution system, dwarfing the wall-to-wall live coverage on Peacock in terms of total minutes watched — and it is still where the money and eyeballs predominantly are, even so total linear TV consumption declined. Accessibility barriers such as costs, discovery, and technology keep introducing friction into consumer OTT adoption.”