The Bundle Bulletin - Peak F1, bad deals and what's French for shitshow?
The homework notes from the number one sports media and streaming podcast
What’s French for shitshow?
https://x.com/SportsProNick/status/1919302154638045441
Introduction
DAZN has confirmed to L’Equipe that it has agreed a termination of LFP contract after 1 year (was 5 years -€400m-a-year ) deal after just one season. As part of the exit:
€100m in compensation to the league
Plus a further €140m in upcoming rights fees
Why it matters
Where do LFP go now?
LFP is seriously considering launching its own direct-to-consumer (DTC) platform (again).
DAZN could potentially ‘partner’ with LFP in the set-up, production and running of the service.
Such a service cold also create a channel which is then distributed to the major French media platforms (as DAZN channel on C+ is currently)
Piracy is a major issue they are facing
Has DAZN inadvertently proven there is a wildly different view from consumers about expectations of LFP compared to consumers? Undoubtably yes
The door has probably closed on resurrecting the major media platforms to compete on sports rights – they already have their own challenges (cord cutting, etc)
Conclusions
Why would an LFP D2C service be more successful than DAZN’s efforts and indeed the previous iteration with MediaPro?
The issues with LFP and domestic rights whilst badly handled over the last 3-4 cycles, are an indication of the adversity to risk all the major platforms across Europe are having
Points to very difficult upcoming negotiations for EPL
Is some sort of D2C inevitable for major football properties in their docmetsi (and international) market?
Yannick’s pull quote
Compartamentalizing things is part of the job description for sports business professionals — and the Ligue 1 break with DAZN will most likely not be definitive. It was almost a fiduciary duty by DAZN to minimize losses, but that doesn’t automatically mean that they can afford to punt on one of Europe’s biggest media markets, considering its global ambitions and undertaken French market investments. As part of the streamer’s channel business, DAZN has understood that it doesn’t have to own the content to deliver to content, and that at a much more reasonable risk-return profile. It can leverage its product, technology, and operations stack, as well as highly-select customer base as a distributor of third-party content. Ligue 1 channel going independently, for its part, is simply not commercially viable, and will depend on amplification by distributors, for reasons including but not limited to: different mind- and skill set required to move from B2B to B2C, cost-prohibitive in terms of marketing and promotion, gatekeepers control audience access in cable/IPTV-dominated French marketplace, and uncompetitive on-field product.
What is ESPN Flagship?
https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/espns-flagship-switch-dawn-directtofan-sports-cables-swan-de-marchis-7qncf/?trackingId=hDa9%2BwQLy2BdjB8GJdGNDQ%3D%3D – Excellent from Carlo De Marchis
https://www.sportspro.com/news/espn-flagship-dtc-product-launch-date-name-price-bob-iger-april-2025/
https://frontofficesports.com/espn-teases-vision-for-biggest-bet-2025-flagship-platform/
Introduction
ESPN to launch in time for 2025 NFL season (autumn) a new service codenamed ‘Flagship’
The D2C platform combines:
Every linear ESPN channel (ESPN, ESPN2, ESPNU, ACC & SEC Networks, etc.)
Current ESPN+ catalogue
Digital, ecommerce, betting, fantasy, interactive stat overlays and personalisation options
The Athletic has reported the product will cost subscribers between US$25 and US$30 per month (not confirmed by ESPN) – “coincidentally” in the same ball park as what current cable households pay for ESPN Linear
The four pillars of the vision
Search & discovery:
Where to watch (and in some circumatnces a friction reduced transition experience
Personalised alerts on the moments you care about.
ESPN wallet - wagers, tickets, merchandise, pay‑per‑view events, digital collectibles
Advance data analytics to personalise commerce experience
Social & community (to keep consumers in the eco system and interacting with content – creating data) - Native watch‑parties, creator commentary, fantasy smack‑talk and live polls
Give advertisers context‑rich inventory.
Fan ID: Log in once and your teams, leagues, stat history and bet slips follow you across devices and, eventually, across borders.
Why it matters
Cord cutting in the US has put ESPN linear revenues in ‘managed decline’
Cord‑cutting is erasing ±2.4 million U.S. subs every quarter
It’s all about money – In the new model: retail pricing, advertising precision, season passes, micro‑bundles and gambling margin
ESPN/Disney believes the DTC service would help ESPN expand its audiences, particularly among younger demographics.
Iger noted that many young fans have turned to “bite-size entertainment”, describing those consumption habits as a reality “we have to address”. “They like multiscreen experiences.”
Carlo de Marchis – “The question rattling boardrooms and barstools alike: is this the first chapter of a rebuilt sports economy, or the closing scene of the TV bundle we grew up with?”
Answer – the pace of change means adapt or die.
D2C not as sticky as cable
Higher churn
Will casual fans swallow the pricing?
Conclusions
Disney/ESPN have long been telegraphing their desire for ESPN to be the first place fans turn—no matter who owns a given right—and the only place they need to watch, bet, chat or shop. Phrases like “premier destination”, “never having to ask where to stream” and “single experience” all telegraph one ambition: position Flagship as the operating system for sports. (parallel in a more general content way to Amazon Prime Video?)
Where ESPN lead, many follow:
Data & $$ - Better CPM’s, cross selling with other Disney products and services
Look for multiple pricing options
Leverage in future sports negotiations
Improved ad inventory (and diversity)
Still some problems:
Not all rights will be ‘linkable’ - Sunday Ticket (YouTube), most Premier League fixtures (NBC/Peacock) and Thursday‑night NFL (Amazon)
Still glass gatekeepers EG Samsung, Roku
Regulatory issues – Recent problems with both Fubo and Venu – They don’t like walled gardens
Skillset – Can ESPN think like a tech platform rather than a sports broadcaster?
Consequences
Accelerate decline of cable ESPN (and cable in general)
Ripple effect for rightsowners?
Where ESPN lead, will others follow (quickly)
Timing could see ESPN lose billions as the market evolves
The debut of “Flagship’ will probably look very different to the product in a few years’ time
Best way to create the right product is to iterate in the marketplace
Not really a decision for ESPN – they had to change to the new environment.
ESPN Rights portfolio is strong and long term despite loss of MLB (which they hope to have back in a ‘different type of deal’)
ESPN brand means something to sports fans (in the US)
Ultimately its about first party data – previously owned by cable operators. D2C needs first‑party data for ads (making a big come back), commerce and betting.
Yannick’s pull quote:
I wouldn’t overestimate the DTC streaming service’s impact on ESPN’s top-line and, to an even lesser extent, bottom-line given all the upfront and ongoing product, technology, and marketing/promotion costs. Flagship is supposed to manage the company’s linear-to-streaming transition, and main usage will probably come from the 70M+ authenticated pay-TV subscribers, making them more sticky and glued to the ESPN ecosystem. New net additions directly signed up over-the-top (of traditional TV distributors) have probably a ceiling of 1-2M subscribers in the medium term. Understandably, ESPN has been a long holdout from untethering its most marque programming from the multichannel video bundle, holding together the pay-TV bundle with FOX, which will actually match ESPN’s move of going DTC with FOX ONE ahead of the new NFL season. Both are going to price their OTT service conservatively, to not accelerate the secular decline of its golden linear goose.
Peak F1? Liberty’s next move
https://frontofficesports.com/formula-one-courts-bidders-as-espn-exclusivity-laps-out/
https://www.grandprix247.com/2025/05/07/miami-grand-prix-suffers-dip-in-tv-viewership-in-usa/
https://www.independent.co.uk/f1/f1-usa-miami-grand-prix-news-cadillac-b2743163.html
https://www.sportspro.com/news/f1-us-media-broadcast-rights-espn-netflix-apple-nbc-february-2025/
Introduction
In the final year of its three-year extension with ESPN paying an estimated $75 million to $90 million annually.
ENP with ESPN expired late 2024
High expectation at F1 new deal will double rights fees – want $160 – $180m
Context – NASCAR 25-31 - $7.7bn or $1.1bn a year
Why it matters
Hugely important growth market for F1 but ratings are flat:
2202 – average 1.2m
2024 – average 1.1m (ratings up for 2025)
This is double 2018
2025 Miami race down 30% (2.17m - 3.07m)
Still 3 best ever US rating but timing bad for media discussions
Context - Ampere Analysis – US motorsports fans:
62% NASACR
38% F1
25% IndyCar
Revamped Concorde agreement gives teams more money so need a good outcome in US
Could consider a mix of linear and digital
Currently F1TV Pro is available and doing well in the US
V Important - In the U.S., the average F1 fan is between 32 and 35 years old, notably younger than the NFL (average age 50), NBA (42), MLB (57), and NHL (49). F1 doesn’t need to chase the 40–50-year-old demographic — it’s already cultivating Gen Z and Gen Alpha, the future leaders and consumers in America.
Conclusions
Cadillac intro next season should help
New F1 movie coming out on Apple with Brad Pitt
Is it time for Liberty to sell?
Long time rumours of Saudi interest at circa $20bn (heavily denied)
Perhaps a view that with over $14bn of future revenues secured but facing potential flattening of revenue, now might be a good time to consider a sell. Liberty have certainly been simplifying their corporate structure to make that easier.
ESPN’s recent decision to walk away from MLB suggests they are not the partner for F1 id they want to grow rights
Netflix remain an option and Amazon spend in the US is now up to 22% of their programming budget
Leftfield option could be a limited number of races on a network (EG US/Canada/Mexico/Brazil) with the remined exclusive to F1 D2C or a pay network.
May be F1 is unfortunately not high enough in volume and/or right timzones to see the desired growth in the US – NASCAR has 36 races all timezone friendly.
WHERE WILL UFC LAND?
https://awfulannouncing.com/ufc/handicapping-media-rights-negotiations.html
Introduction
Current deal is $1.5bn for 5 years (end in 2023) – then extended for a further 2 years
Bloomberg reports UFC looking for $1bn/year
Allegedly Amazon, Netflix, Warner Bros. Discovery, and YouTube are all looking at it
Why it matters
Who needs who? With changes at ESPN, do they need UFC even more?
So much uncertainty in the market – players keeping their powder dry?
UFC is on a hot streak
Conclusions
TKO did WWE Netflix deal which seems to be doing very well – indication for UFC?
Netflix like regularly scheduled sports
Could UFC go multi-partner like NFL?
Prediction – ESPN will retain a chunk – may be just PPV for ESPN+ but Netflix will also get a chunk.
EA Sport FC & MLS
https://www.cnbc.com/2025/05/05/mls-ea-sports-fc-mobile-streaming-matches.html
Introduction
4 MLS matches this season will be available via EA Sports FC Mobile
First is free to players
Will receive 1 month of Apple LS Season pass + in game currency
Simulcast with Apple
Why it matters
First time EA has done live streaming
Apple partnership now being described as “launchpad to experiment with various partners, with the goal of leading fans back to the MLS Season Pass platform”
Conclusions
Challenging times (for both EA and MLS broadcasts) lead to innovation.
Will be watched carefully by others – could be the start of a trend – reaching digital natives
Yannick’s pull quote
After securing its gate-keeping role for the next decade of the MLS, Apple initially went uber-exclusive in its distribution mix with such mid-tier property. It’s been course-correcting this off-season, though, and once the Messi-hype in season one waned and stopped masking realities. And I like their current adjustments, from traditional channels (like carriage on multi-channel video distributors such as DirecTV and sublicenses to international broadcasters) to innovative digital partnerships (like distribution in mobile-first ecosystem with hyper-select digital audiences such as EASports FC Mobile). All but top-of-the-pyramid content needs to be subsidized by media distributors, amplifiers and multipliers nowadays — let alone not being hidden on a sub-scale walled garden in Apple TV(+).
